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A REGIONAL APPROACH AND 








ABSTRACT: Today, Critical Infrastructures are 
regionally interconnected. Countries’ security 
and stability rely more on international 
cooperation every day and this should be even 
truer within the European Union framework. 
Recently, the EU has provided a general 
definition of CI and proposed a European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
It seeks to provide an all-hazard cross-sectoral 
approach and it is supported by regular 
exchanges of information between EU States in 
the framework of the CIP Contact Points 
meetings. EPCIP is fundamental for our 
common market security, but by analysing 
state-of-the-art technology, this paper will try to 
show that EPCIP lacks fully efficient CI 
protection and thus will propose an EU model of 










































a cyber constant contact strategy. A single 
coordination of several regional CI frameworks 
could represent an effective solution, 
implemented on the EU principle of subsidiarity, 
by avoiding excessive bureaucracy. 
 
Introduction 
In an environment where the critical 
infrastructures are becoming increasingly 
interdependent, policymakers and citizens are 
increasingly aware of threats presented by 
radical political movements and terrorist 
attacks. Due to their interconnected nature, 
which is mainly powered by cyber systems, CI's 
are very vulnerable and can trigger cross-
border effects due to their inherently regional or 
global nature. Within such a scenario, the 
European Union is still in search of a role to 
play. The EU is supporting its members through 
the European Commission that is entrusted with 
the task of promoting awareness of this 
important topic, facilitating cooperation between 
member states, fostering the exchange of 
know-how, and coaching Member States in 
their efforts. In 2006, the EU launched the 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (EPCIP) to improve recognizing 
threats as well as protection from terrorism as 
one of its main priorities (Commission 2006). 
Subsidiarity and confidentiality are among the 
principles that inspired EPCIP as well as, later, 
the EU Directive on security of network and 
information systems, known as the NIS 
Directive (European Parliament 2016). 
However, analysing cyberspace peculiarities of 
EPCIP and NIS should encourage Member 











































higher fragmentation, to foster a new local 
cooperation approach within the general EU 
coordination scheme. This article would like to 
highlight that the proposed schemes, given the 
legal framework, do not effectively cope with 
the threats that countries are facing in the CI 
field, they remain too fragmented and do not 
consider the security problems posed by cyber 
interconnectedness. 
Critical infrastructures and cyber domain in EU policies 
The EPCIP framework consists of procedures 
for the identification and designation of 
European Critical Infrastructures, with a 
common approach to the assessment of the 
needs to improve the protection of such 
infrastructures and in measures designed to 
facilitate the implementation of EPCIP together 
with support for Member States concerning 
National Critical Infrastructures (NCI). The 
above actions are based on principles clearly 
defined in paragraph 2.3 of the Commission 




• Stakeholder Cooperation  
• Proportionality  
• Sector-by-Sector Approach 
 
In general, subsidiarity, one of the fundamental 
principles contained in European treaties, 
governs the exercise of the EU’s competences 










































proportionality. In areas in which the European 
Union does not have exclusive competence, the 
principle of subsidiarity seeks to safeguard the 
ability of Member States to make decisions and 
authorises intervention by the Union when the 
objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, but can be 
better achieved at the Union level, ‘by reason of 
the scale and effects of the proposed action.’ 
The purpose of including a reference to the 
principle in the EU Treaties is to also ensure 
that powers are exercised as close to the 
citizen as possible, in accordance with the 
proximity principle referred to in Article 10(3) of 
the TEU (Gaiser 2018). 
EPCIP defines its subsidiarity approach as the 
effort of the Commission in the CIP field to 
focus on infrastructure that is critical from a 
European perspective, rather than a national or 
regional one. Although focusing on European 
Critical Infrastructures, the Commission may, 
where requested and taking due account of 
existing Community competences and available 
resources, provide support to Member States 
concerning National Critical Infrastructures. 
If we combine such an approach with the 
definition of confidentiality stating that access to 
CI information should be granted only on a 
need-to-know basis, we can argue that the 
existing CI European security framework does 
not take into account cyber domain 
characteristics that invent a new, more flexible 
and certainly more coordinated regional 
approach.  Cyber threats are fluid and constant 












































While going in the right, complementary, 
direction, the Directive on security of network 
and information systems did not fully solve the 
highlighted issue.  
According to the European Commission, the 
NIS Directive provides legal measures to boost 
the overall level of cybersecurity in the EU by 
ensuring: 
• Member States preparedness by 
requiring them to be appropriately 
equipped, e.g. via a Computer 
Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT) and a competent national 
NIS authority. 
• Cooperation among all Member 
States by setting up a cooperation 
group in order to support and 
facilitate strategic cooperation and 
the exchange of information among 
Member States. They will also need 
to set up a CSIRT Network to 
promote swift and effective 
operational cooperation on specific 
cybersecurity incidents and sharing 
information about risks. 
• A culture of security across sectors 
which is vital for our economy and 
society and moreover rely heavily 
on ICTs, such as energy, transport, 
water, banking, financial market 
infrastructures, healthcare, and 
digital infrastructure. Businesses in 
these sectors that are identified by 
Member States as operators of 
essential services will have to take 
appropriate security measures and 










































relevant national authority. Also, key 
digital service providers (search 
engines, cloud computing services 
and online marketplaces) will have 
to comply with the security and 
notification requirements under the 
new Directive. 
 
Both EPCIP and the NIS Directive support the 
establishment of country-based authorities that 
should manage all cyber and CI vulnerabilities 
at the local level, facilitating cooperation and 
exchange of information among States setting 
up a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information 
Network, a CSIRT Network, and favouring the 
requiring cross-border synergies. Unfortunately, 
carefully examining the definitions contained in 
the mentioned documents, in coordination with 
the effects they had on legislation by single 
Member States, it is easy to note that the 
policies in place to remedy the increased 
vulnerability of infrastructures are still eminently 
local.  
While respecting NIS, States are shaping a very 
heterogeneous scheme of national authorities. 
While Slovenia is opting for an independent 
institution, Italy and the Czech Republic prefer 
to entitle their main intelligence agencies as a 
coordinator of national cybersecurity strategy, 
still others are choosing an altogether different 
path to achieve the listed goals. Almost every 
Member State has its own NIS approach, which 
within EPCIP the given subsidiarity definition 
does not really contribute to the shaping of 
different, compatible, coordinated levels of 
authorities responsible for broader regional 











































are not only national or European, they mainly 
connect groups of State, this means that they 
are regional. EU members are pursuing 
fragmented policies; consequently, this has led 
to a significant lack of cooperation between 
national governments and EU institutions in 
setting up a coordinated emergency response 
to potential threats. The higher degree of risk, 
to which our daily activities are exposed, is not 
mirrored by an increased response potential by 
EU institutions. Yet Member States are indeed 
interdependent critical infrastructures that are 
mainly cross-border infrastructures and the 
weakest links affect the vulnerability of all 
countries. 
Cyberspace: a domain characterized by no sovereignty 
and constant contact  
As noted already in the article Resilient critical 
infrastructure and economic intelligence in the 
cyber domain, the deterrence paradigm 
represents a stabilizing, ordering moment in 
understanding the CI defence issue. CI must be 
resistant to attacks to such an extent that it 
simply makes no sense for hackers to spend 
time and resources on taking it down. To 
seriously destabilize “highly qualified resources, 
hackers need access to state-of-the-art 
technology” and “in most cases, only state-
players can afford such a level of coordination” 
(Gaiser 2017). CIs are highly qualified 
resources protected by state-of-the-art 
technologies developed through expensive 
research and production programmes. This 
means that in order to compete on this cyber 
level, there needs to be at least an equivalent 
economic and technological effort. This is the 










































leading strategy in looking for answers within 
the cyber-warfare domain.  
However, deterrence, even expressing its best 
denial potential right in the CI field, cannot be 
adopted as a comfortable solution for any kind 
of threat due to the very specific characteristics 
of cyberspace, it being the only military domain 
disconnected from territorial sovereignty 
boundaries and based, contrary to deterrence 
theory, on constant contact among international 
actors. The deterrence concept is tightly 
connected with the old concept of Westphalian 
sovereignty pretending the respect of non-
intervention and territorial integrity principles. It 
is based on the threat of use of force with the 
operational aim of avoiding costly operational 
contacts convincing the adversary that 
challenging the status quo outweighs the 
benefits. A deterrence strategy pretends the 
absence of action or contact, this is the reason 
why it can be adopted by a critical infrastructure 
security strategy, especially considering that 
any attack in this field has to be based mainly 
on expensive software and hardware 
technologies that can cope with the most 
advanced defence systems adopted by CI 
operators. A considerable level of intelligence 
and coordination skills are needed to discover 
their vulnerabilities and the development of 
such weaponry requires substantial funding.  
Once the threshold of deterrence, and its 
means of a no-action status, should be crossed, 
actors would find themselves in war. Cyber 
weapons exploit software and hardware 
vulnerabilities to gain access to critical targets. 
A cyber conflict is highly unpredictable, fast, 
and dynamic since it annihilates the strategic 











































cyber domain, it is practically impossible to 
send notifications in time, the definition of 
sovereign territory especially loses a great part 
of its meaning. The cyberspace operational 
domain is global and unique given that there is 
currently no internationally agreed definition of 
cyberspace sovereignty and given it is a 
domain in which all other operational domains 
and national instruments of power are enabled 
or even dependent.  
Nevertheless, every day as it becomes more 
technology dependent, an infrastructures’ 
security paradigm has to accept that the 
greatest part of cyber destabilization occurs 
under the threshold of a formal act of war and 
that instead of absence of action it is 
characterized by uninterrupted action because 
cyberspace is a constantly contested space 
where State and non-State actors are 
continuously interconnected and consequently 
all operations in cyberspace always involve 
operational contact. The tactical, operational, 
and strategic bases of deterrence do not align 
with the characteristics and dynamics of 
cyberspace (Harknett, Fischerkeller 2017), 
where offence always has an advantage over 
defence. The cybernetic systems’ offensive 
non-equilibrium favours action over passivity 
(Gaiser 2017). This is the reason why 
deterrence theory, working very well in 
presence of certain conditions, is only partially 
applicable when CI stability is at stake. States 
or other significant non-State actors operate in 
cyberspace through cyber operations, activities, 
and actions (OAAs) trying to dominate the 
domain to always be in the strongest position 
and OAAs usually maintain their intensity under 
the level of an act of war. All OAAs can be 










































espionage, and subversion. All three of the 
reported categories are closely related to the 
critical infrastructures’ security being used 
together or separately to affect their efficiency 
but, as demonstrated by current practice, OAAs 
cause damages that are of a very different 
nature of use of force occurring regularly below 
such a level.  
The only way to secure an unsecured space, 
improving defence and resilience, is by 
maintaining a constant presence to anticipate 
the exploitation of a CI system and 
simultaneously capture the enemy’s 
capabilities. 
A new approach to European CI cybersecurity 
governance: constant presence and subsidiarity  
The complexity of the exposed issues above 
can be better understood by how they are 
coordinated with the challenge represented by 
terrorism. Cyberspace is a fluid, technically 
changing environment, continuously increasing 
in scale and sophistication that must be 
constantly supervised and redefined by actors’ 
stable presence. Moreover, it is a swiftly 
evolving environment where actors are 
continuously innovating to penetrate or attack 
systems. In cyberspace adaptations in 
responses are quickly met with new breaches. 
This ever changing competition of learning and 
adapting lies at core of cyberterrorism. The 
need for agile learning to create capacity to 
adapt is an essential characteristic of 
cyberspace (Ariely 2014). Terrorist networks 
are intuitive learning organizations (Jackson 
2004) which act as a complex adaptive system 
(Ariely 2006). This challenges the abilities of 











































government agencies and organizations to 
become agile and a complex adaptive system, 
without losing the advantages of hierarchy. 
According to Ariely (2006) cyber confrontation 
is a learning competition. In the future, the 
intensity of critical infrastructures’ cyber 
destabilization can be foreseen mainly under 
the level of an armed aggression where OAAs 
can reach strategic effects. Pursuing a purely 
deterrence-based strategy, especially in 
presence of acts of terrorism, could lead to a 
defence vacuum. Terrorism intimately 
represents an asymmetric confrontation leaving 
a reduced space for retaliation. In the absence 
of a generally accepted definition under 
international law, terrorism can be defined as 
the intentional and systematic use of actions 
designed to provoke terror in the public as a 
means to certain ends. Terrorism can be the act 
of an individual or a group of individuals acting 
in their individual capacity or with the support of 
a State, though generally terrorist actions are 
rarely treated as an armed aggression. Such 
considerations, jointly exanimate with the 
above-exposed positions concerning the cyber 
environment, automatically imply that cyber 
terrorism also must be, and can be, properly 
anticipated and prevented before a disruptive 
event happens. Actors defending cyberspace 
enabled or dependent critical infrastructure 
should create matrices able to produce 
consequential effects, prevent exploitations, 
reduce enemies’ capabilities, and accordingly 
lower potential threats. A constant presence 
strategy permits the shaping of a persistent 
mitigation policy. 
Moreover, a constant presence strategy is 
needed because the terrain of cyber 










































human created space and every new software 
version, platform, user interface, and process 
shifts that terrain. It is perpetually under 
construction (Harknett, Nye 2017). A European 
network of heterogeneous national cyber-
authorities accounting to hardly comparable 
national bodies, coordinating private and public 
stakeholders on different principles, and 
cooperating among themselves on the EU level 
mainly on a voluntary basis will not likely 
mitigate potential attacks.  
As mentioned above, while following NIS 
directive and EPCIP indications almost every 
EU Member State adopted its own policy for 
shaping a national experienced-based cyber-
ecosystem. Even the very simple issue of 
defining the Critical Infrastructures Protection 
(CIP) Contact Points requested by EPCIP to 
facilitate the exchange of information and 
emergency management coordination financed 
and established by governments never reached 
the needed efficiency given that single local 
reference offices have been appointed following 
divergent approaches and sometimes 
incomparable priorities. 
Even the Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams Network just provides a forum where 
Member States' National CSIRTs can 
cooperate, exchange information, and build 
trust (ENISA 2018). Thanks to the CSIRT 
Network, Member States’ CSIRTs are able to 
improve the handling of cross-border incidents 
and even discuss how to respond in a 
coordinated manner to specific incidents, but it 
is still a far cry from the tight coordination that 
contemporary cyberspace implies. Member 
states are at varying degrees of maturity with 











































and effective CIP policy. Second, there are 
islands of cooperation across the EU member 
states but no overall concept of operations at 
the EU level (CEPS 2010). A lack of 
coordination efficiency, together with national 
based CI defence approaches and no regional 
centres of cooperation, never shaped a CI 
security system that could be metaphorically 
defined as an IC cyber fortress within EU 
space.  
In 2017, even as the European Council 
correctly detected the problem, it failed to 
address it in a proper holistic way. In October 
2017, the European Council asked for the 
adoption of a common approach to EU 
cybersecurity following the reform package 
recommending a stronger EU cybersecurity 
agency proposed by the European Commission 
in September. 
According to the European Council (2017), this 
reform would aim to upgrade the measures put 
in place by the cybersecurity strategy and its 
main pillar, the Directive on security of network 
and information systems - the NIS Directive. 
Consequently, the Commission recommended 
the constitution of a cybersecurity agency on 
the structures of the existing European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) in order to help Member States, EU 
institutions, and businesses deal with cyber-
attacks. 
The proposal is the result of a correct analysis, 
but it does not solve the problem of having 
almost thirty national agencies or authorities 
dealing with cyber threats and defending 
national critical infrastructure and no official 










































– coordinating regionally relevant CI security. 
Although European national intelligence 
agencies and NIS created authorities exchange 
their information daily, cooperating with law 
enforcement activities as well as to prevent 
threats, the subsidiarity principle as described 
in EPCIP and indirectly implemented through 
the NIS directive is unsuitable to ensure stable 
performances and the security of regional 
relevant critical infrastructures. An early 
warning national system concerning certain CI 
that works could not be “early” enough for other 
countries dependent on, or responsible for a 
length of, the same CI. Within a cyber 
environment, where the notions of territoriality, 
distance, and time lose their importance and 
where preventing harm involves complex 
mechanisms, fragmentation has to be avoided 
in favour of a broader synergy.  
In the field of transnational CI, the old fashion 
national interest and need-to-know approaches 
characterizing cross-border and intra-agencies 
information exchanges should mostly be 
relinquished. Especially because in an 
environment marked by uninterrupted action 
where uninterrupted action is requested also for 
a CI security keeper, it is almost impossible to 
know in advance what is “need-to-know” and 
the safety margins designed preventively may 
not be sufficient to cope with the expected and, 
most of all, unexpected stresses arriving upon 
the systems (Zio 2016). Coordination centres 
with no real power, institutional fragmentation, 
bureaucratic obstacles, a heterogeneity of 
approaches, and insufficiency of real-time 
cooperation are all factors that preclude 
concrete cyber-defence policies. Concerning CI 
of European or regional importance, it cannot 











































its weakest link and in an environment of 
interconnected domains, where only the 
constant contact strategy can erode the will or 
nullify the possibility of somebody from doing 
something, our security seeking institutions 
must react with synergy.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
subsidiarity as the idea that a central authority 
should have a subsidiary function, performing 
only those tasks which cannot be performed 
effectively at a more immediate or local level. 
Within the European Union, the subsidiarity 
principle, unfortunately, has always been 
understood as the duties’ division between EU 
and national States. It has never been 
interpreted originally as the principle dividing 
responsibilities among more levels and the 
entitling of a certain obligation to the most 
suitable one, no matter if positioned in a sub-
State or on an intra-State level (Gaiser, 2018). 
The constitution of regional CI security bodies, 
regional intelligence hubs, could represent the 
first attempt at creating intra-State EU 
cooperation projects. The need for a strategy of 
interconnectedness that creates regional cyber 
ecosystems in order to support the fluent 
functioning of cross-border infrastructures is 
dictated by the contemporary economy 
framework as well as by its cyber 
interdependency. Search for security within 
cyberspace does not allow for institutional 
fragmentation or action/reaction delays. It is 
almost impossible to adopt a constant presence 
strategy otherwise, but instead, there is work 
without unity, with no sharing of information in 
real time or only on the presumed need-to-know 











































Regional cyber/IC ecosystems should be 
created to diminish the risk of cyber-attacks to 
critical infrastructure whose fluent operability 
and comprehensive security are shared among 
different countries. If a trunk or cyber system of 
a certain country fell under a cyber-attack it 
does not mean that that country is the main 
target. An enemy will likely always try to 
destabilize, provoking as much disruption as 
possible, by passing through the less risky or 
more weak, careless, channel, at the same time 
carefully planning the chain reaction 
propagation of its strike.  
A self-reliant, fully operable, technologically 
updated, and intelligence active EU regional 
hub’s network responsible for the cybersecurity 
of regionally relevant critical infrastructures 
could represent an additional step forward, a 
safer common market, and an improved 
common security policy. An EU cybersecurity 
governance shaped on a middle-level network 
between States and the EU could better 
prevent aggressions against our sources of 
power by elevating EU Member States 
capabilities in preventing or managing a crisis 
thus eliminating unavoidable frictions posed by 
the coordination of several national based 
institutions and intelligence agencies. 
Conclusions 
The EPCIP came about as a result of the 
European Council requesting, in 2004, a 
strategy seeking to protect critical infrastructure 
through its Communication on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the Fight Against 
Terrorism. By analysing the state-of-the-art of 
CI cybersecurity frameworks within the EU and 











































operable within this new domain of power, it 
can be concluded that the all-hazard cross-
sectoral approach is not fully efficient. 
Coordination by EU programmes and 
Directives, Member States, and detected 
National and European Critical Infrastructures 
are creating their national authorities with 
pertinent cyber-ecosystems following almost all 
main indications and suggestions. They are 
improving collaborations thanks to better 
information sharing and alerting systems, the 
development of ways to assess 
interdependence, and the creation of good 
practices. However, the security of regionally 
relevant critical infrastructure is still dangerously 
fragmented and terrorist attacks, criminal 
activities, or even State sponsored 
destabilizations can represent, especially in 
cyberspace, serious threats to common CI 
integrity if they exploit the deficiencies 
presented in intelligence, defence, and 
management systems of single national 
institutions that remain primarily responsible for 
the protection of all facilities.  
Accepting the theory that cyber domain is 
characterized by uninterrupted activity, 
occurring mainly under the threshold of the 
formal definition of an act of war and that a 
strategy of constant presence is needed to 
control and influence events, it is clear that any 
delay in understanding events, communication, 
or coordination can be fatal. For this reason, an 
improved European approach is needed. It 
should be based on a more appropriate 
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle and, 
consequently, on a constitution of regional CI 
security hubs where needed. The EU should 
launch a pilot project, for example, one located 










































numerous countries connected to a common 
CI, which would allow for the development of 
new capabilities to better guarantee stability in 
the common market and improve Member State 
security. Stability and resilience shall be 
achieved by shaping a new cybersecurity 
governance system based on regional cyber-
ecosystems operating autonomously in order to 
effectively anticipate any potential disruption.. 
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